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Abstract
In thispaper we introducesituationsinvolvingthe linear transformationof products,
in short: LTP situations. LTP situations are production situations where each producer
has a single linear transformation technique. We show that the corresponding LTP
games are totally balanced. Next, we relate LTP situations to exchange economies in
two different ways and we prove the existence of an equilibrium in these economies.
Finally, we extend the LTP situation to one where a producer may have more than
one linear transformation technique. We show that each totally balanced game with
nonnegative values is an extended LTP game.
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1 Introduction
In OWEN(1975)linearproductionsituationswereintroduced. Theseareproductionsituations
where each producer can use a pre-determined set of linear production techniquesto produce
goods. Each producer is endowed with a bundle of resources. A restriction of this model is
that each production process can have only one output good, so, this model excludes linear
production processes with by-products. In this paper we introduce situations involving the
linear transformation of products (LTP situations) to deal with production techniques with
at least one output good. We deﬁne the set of products to be the set of all goods including
resources. In an LTP situation we have a set of producers and, for the moment, we assume
that each producer controls only one transformation technique. Later, we will extend this to
situations where each producer can control more than one linear transformation technique.
Each producer owns a bundle of resource goods which he can use in his transformation
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1(production) process or which he can sell directly on the market. The outcome of the
transformation process, the produced goods, will also be sold on the market. The goal of
each producer is to maximize his proﬁt given his transformation technique, resource bundle
and market prices.
The organization of this paper is as follows. First we give a formal description of LTP
situations. Next we introduceLTP games and we show thatthese games are totallybalanced.
ThenwerelateLTPsituationstoexchangeeconomiesintwodifferentways. Intheﬁrstmodel,
producers may exchange their resources at endogenous exchange prices before production
starts. Each producer wants to maximize his proﬁt given the exogenous market prices. In
the second model, producers may exchange their productionat endogenousexchange prices.
After this exchange, they can, once more, apply their transformation technique and sell the
resulting bundle of goods at the exogenous market prices. Again each producer wants to
maximize his proﬁt. We show that under certain conditions both models allow for a market
equilibrium. A new characterization of totally balanced games with nonnegative values is
givennext bymeans ofextendedLTPsituationsinwhicheach producercan controlmorethan
one linear transformation technique. Existing characterizations of totally balanced games in
the literatureare the classof ﬂow games by KALAI and ZEMEL (1982) and theclass of market
games, by SHAPLEY and SHUBIK (1969). A characterization of totally balanced games with
nonnegativevaluesistheclassoflinearproductiongames(cf. OWEN (1975)andTIJS(1995)).
Finally, an appendix contains the proofs that were omitted in the text.
2 LTP situations
We start this section with an example. In the chemical industry, a reﬁnery process is used to
manufacturefromcrudeoilother,moreuseful,productslikegasoline,keroseneandpetroleum
solvents. For example, suppose that 500 barrels of gasoline,300 barrels of kerosene and 100
barrels of petroleum solvents can be manufactured from 1000 barrels of crude oil requiring
100hoursoflabour. Assumingthattheproductionprocessislinear, thisproductiontechnique































and petroleum solvents are the output goods. Since the production technique is linear, any
nonnegative multiple of a is a possible production technique. The value of this nonnegative
multiplieriscalledtheactivitylevel. Forinstance,ifaﬁrmoperatesatactivitylevel3, shecan
2manufacture 1500 barrels of gasoline, 900 barrels of kerosene and 300 barrels of petroleum
solventsfrom 300 hours of labour and 3000barrels of crude oil. Obviously,the activitylevel
of a ﬁrm is restrained by the number of input goods at her disposal.
LTP situations describe production situationsin which each producer controls a transfor-
mation technique, as described in the example above, and a bundle of (resource) goods. The
transformation technique is modelled by a vector that describes which goods and how many
the producer needs to produce other goods. Transformation techniques are linear, i.e. the
output is a linear function of the input. A producer has to choose at which activity level his
productionprocesswilloperate. The choice of the activitylevel willdependon the resources
owned by the producer. Given an activity level, the transformation technique describes how
much input is needed. Then the producer can carry out his production process at a certain
activity level only if his resources contain the required input. After production, the producer
sellsalltheremaininggoods,i.e. producedgoodsandresourcesnotusedinthetransformation
process, on themarket. We assume thatthe marketis insatiable,sothatall goodscan be sold.
Furthermore, all producers are pricetakers. Theiroutputdoes not inﬂuence themarket prices.
The goal of each producer is to maximize his proﬁt from the sale of the remaining goods.
Next, we introduce some notation. Denote by M the ﬁnite set of goods and by N the
ﬁnite set of producers. Each producer i 2 N is endowedwitha bundleof goods!(i) 2 IR M
+ .
The vector ai 2 IR M describes the transformation technique of producer i in the following
way. Producer i needs −ai
j unitsof each goodj withai
j  0 to produce ai
k unitsof the goods
k with ai
k  0. We assume that each vector ai contains at least one positiveand one negative
element. Let yi betheactivitylevelof produceri 2 N. Thenforthe productionof thebundle
fai
jyijai
j  0gheneedsthe resources f−ai
jyijai
j  0g. Since weassume thetransformation
technique to be irreversible, we have that activitylevels are nonnegative, that is,yi  0.
We have seen that producer i uses good j as an input in his transformation process if
ai
j  0 and that good j is an output if ai
j  0. The resources needed for the transformation
process are thus described by the vector gi with gi
j := maxf0;−ai
jg for all j 2 M, i 2 N.
So, atactivitylevelyi produceriusesthebundlegiyi toproduce(ai+gi)yi. Afterproduction,
producer i possesses the bundle !(i)+(a i+g i)y i−g iy i =!(i)+a iy iwhich he can sell
at exogenously given market prices p 2 I RM
+ nf0g. Since a producer cannot use more goods
than he has available, it must hold that giyi  !(i). The proﬁt maximization problem of
producer i 2 N thus becomes:
max pT(!(i)+a iy i)
s :t:g i y i  ! ( i )
y i  0
The transformationtechniquesandresources of all producerscan be summarized by deﬁning
the transformation matrix A 2 I RMN,w h e r et h ei th column of A corresponds to the
transformation vector ai and the vector ! := (!(i))i2N. In short, an LTP situation is




that when producers cooperate, they cannot use the output of other producers as resources
for their production. Furthermore, the activitylevels of the producers in this coalitionshould
be such that the total resources cover the total input needed. After transformation, the
coalition sells the remaining goods, i.e. produced goodsand resources not used in any of the
transformation processes, on the market at exogenous market prices. The goal of a coalition
is to maximize its proﬁt.
If a coalition S  N, S 6= ; cooperates, it collectively owns the resource bundle
!(S): =
P
i 2 S! ( i )and moreover, this coalition can use each transformation technique ai,
i 2 S. To produce
P
i2S(ai + gi)yi it needs the input
P
i2S giyi. After transformation,
coalition S can sell
P
i2S(!(i)+a iy i)=! ( S )+Ay where y is the vector of all activity
levels with yi =0if i= 2S . Since the coalition cannot use more goods than it has available,
it shouldholdthat
P
i2S giyi  !(S)or, equivalently,Gy  !(S) withyi =0if i= 2S .T h e
proﬁt maximization problem of the coalitionthus equals
max pT(!(S)+Ay)
s:t:G y  ! ( S )
y  0
y i =0i fi= 2S
(1)
So, an LTP situation gives rise to a cooperative game as the following deﬁnition shows. Let
hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation. Then the corresponding LTP game (N;v)is such that the
characteristic function v assigns to each coalition S  N the maximal proﬁt it can obtain as
g i v e ni n( 1 )a n dv ( ; )=0 . The followingexample illustratesthis deﬁnition.














































The corresponding LTP game equals
v(S) : optimal activity level y :
v(f1g)=9 y=( 0 ;0 ;0)T
v(f2g)=1 4 y=( 0 ;0 ;0)T
v(f3g)=1 7 y=( 0 ;0 ;4)T
v(f1;2g)=23 y=( y 1;0 ;0)T; 0  y1  2
v(f1;3g)=30 y=( y 1;0 ;8)T; 0  y1  4
v(f2;3g)=31 y=( 0 ;0 ;4)T
v(f1;2;3g)=46 y=( y 1;0 ;10)T; 0  y1  4
4Themainissueofcooperativegametheoryishowtodividethebeneﬁtsfrom cooperation.
For LTP games, this means how cooperating producers divide their joint proﬁt among each
other. One way to share the joint proﬁt from cooperation is to do this according to a core-










x i=v ( N)a n d
X
i 2 S
x iv( S) for all S 2 2Nnf;g
)
where 2Nnf;gdenotesthe setof allnonemptysubsetsof N. When a core-element x 2 C(v)
is proposed as a distribution of the total proﬁt v(N) where producer i gets payoff xi,t h e n
coalition S will get at least as much as it can obtain on its own since
P
i2S xi  v(S).S o ,
no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition N.Ag a m ei sbalanced if it has a
nonempty core and it is called totally balanced if each subgame (S;vjS) is balanced, where
vjS(T): =v ( T)if T  S: The following theorem shows that an LTP game has a nonempty
core.
Theorem 1 Let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation. Then the correspondingLTP game (N;v)
has a nonempty core.
Proof. Based on the LTP game (N;v) we can deﬁne a new game (N;a) where a(S)=
p T! ( S ) . In this game each coalition gets the value of its endowment !(S).N e x t ,w ed e ﬁ n e
another game (N;u)where u(S)=v ( S)−a ( S)or, equivalently,
u(S) = max pTAy
s:t:G y  ! ( S )
y  0
y i =0i fi= 2S
In this game, the value u(S) is the net proﬁt coalition S obtainsover the value pT!(S) of its
initial endowment by optimally using the transformation technique. In the case S = N the
above maximization problem reduces to
u(N) = max pTAy
s:t:G y  ! ( N )
y  0
To this problem corresponds the followingdual minimization problem:
min zT!(N)
s:t:G T z  A T p
z  0
(2)
Let theminimum1 of(2)beobtainedinz. First,weshowthatx =( x 1;:::;x n) T,w h e r ex i=





1Since the set of feasible solutions is closed,convex,non-empty and boundedfrom below by the zero-vector,
the problem can be solved and a minimum exists.
5zT!(N)=u ( N) .S o ,xrepresents a distributionof u(N) among the members of N. Notice
that z is also a feasible solution of the problem
min fzT!(S)jGTz  ATp; z  0g for all S  N. Thus,
zT!(S)  minfzT!(S)jGTz  ATp; z  0g
=m a x f p T AyjGy  !(S); y  0g
 maxfpTAyjGy  !(S); y  0; yi =0i fi= 2S g





i2S zT!(i)=z T! ( S )u ( S )and thus x 2 C(u).
Next, we show that x0 2 C(v) with x0








i = zT!(N)+p T!(N)=u ( N)+a (N)=v ( N) . Hence x0 2 C(v).
2
Theorem 1 implies that an LTPgame is balanced. Since each subgame(S;vjS) ofan LTP
game is another LTP game, an LTP game is totally balanced. Note that the proof of theorem
1 also indicates how to ﬁnd a core-element of an LTP game.
When the minimum of (2) is attained in z then z + p is the vector containingthe shadow
prices of the resources. The vector z contains the prices that coalition N w o u l dw a n tt op a y
for its resources in excess of p.
The goal of each coalition is to maximize its proﬁt. From all the bundles of goods that
the coalitioncan produce, itwillchoosethe bundlethatgives her maximal proﬁt. We can use
a multi-commodity game as studied in VAN DEN NOUWELAND,A ARTS and BORM (1989) to
describe for each coalitionthe set of bundles of goods it can sell. Let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP
situation. Then the corresponding multi-commodity game (N;F) i sag a m ew h e r eNis the
player set and for all S  N
F(S)=f x2I R M
+ jx! ( S )+Ay; Gy  !(S); y  0; yi =0i fi= 2S g
and F(;)=f 0 g .
Note that if an LTP game (N;v)and a multi-commodity game (N;F)are both based on
the same LTP situation hN;A;!;pi, then we can write
v(S) = max pTx
s:t:x 2 F ( S )
We showthata multi-commoditygame correspondingtoan LTPsituationistotallybalanced.
First, we deﬁne when multi-commodity games are (totally) balanced (cf. VAN DEN NOUWE-
LAND et al. (1989)). For S  N let eS 2 I RN denote the characteristic vector of S,s o
e S
i =1if i 2 S and eS
i =0otherwise. A map  :2 Nnf;g ! I R+ is a balanced map if
P
S22Nnf;g(S)eS = eN. A multi-commodity game (N;F) is balanced if for all balanced
6maps  itholdsthat
P
S22Nnf;g(S)F(S)  F(N).2 Thisgame istotallybalanced iffor all
S 2 2Nnf;gthe restricted game (S;FjS) is balanced, where FjS(U)=F( U)for all U  S.
Theorem 2 Let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation. Then the corresponding multi-commodity
game (N;F)is totally balanced.
Proof. Let (N;F) be the multi-commodity game corresponding to the LTP situation
hN;A;!;pi and let S 2 2Nnf;g. We show that
P
U22Snf;g(U)F(U)  F(S) for all
balanced maps  for coalition S.
Let xU 2 F(U) for all U  S. Then there is a yU 2 IR N
+ such that xU  !(U)+
AyU, GyU  !(U) and yU
i =0if i= 2U .D e ﬁ n e z :=
P
U22Snf;g(U)xU and y :=
P
U22Snf;g(U)yU.T h e n
z=
P






U22 Snf;g(U)yU = !(S)+Ay










U: i 2 U ( U) ! ( i )
=
P
i 2 S! ( i )=! ( S ) :










(U)!(U)=! ( S) :
Since z  !(S)+Ay, Gy  !(S), y  0 and yi =0if i= 2Sit followsthat z 2 F(S).
2
If a multi-commodity game is balanced then there exists a so-called stable outcome (cf.
VANDENNOUWELANDetal.(1989)). ThesetSO(F)ofstableoutcomesinamulti-commodity












i2N xi 2 Par(F(N));
P




where Par(X)=f x2X j69 z2X:zxand z 6= xg is the set of Pareto-optimal
allocations in X. A stable outcome x is such that no coalitioncan obtain more units of each
good than it gets according to x.
The next theorem shows the relationship between core-elements of an LTP game (N;v)
and stable outcomes of a multi-commodity game (N;F).
Theorem 3 Let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation with correspondingLTP game (N;v)and
correspondingmulti-commoditygame (N;F).L e t2I R N
+be a core-element of (N;v)and
let  2 F(N) be such that pT = v(N).I fp>0and v(N) > 0,t h e nx2(I RM
+ )N with
xi =[  i( v ( N))−1] for all i 2 N, is a stable outcome of (N;F).
2For A;B  I RM
+ ,  2 I R, A + B := fx + yjx 2 A; y 2 Bg and A := fxj x 2 Ag.







 =  2
F(N).I f S2 2 N nf;g and z 2 IR M
+ such that z 
P
i2S xi, z 6=
P
i2S xi then pTz>
p TP
i 2 Sx i=
P
i 2 Sp Tx i=
P
i 2 S iv ( S ) so z= 2F ( S ) . We conclude that x 2 SO(F).
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4 Exchange economies
In this section we relate LTP situationsto exchange economies in two different ways. In the
ﬁrst model, called model 1, producers can exchange their resources before transformation
starts. This exchange takes place in a separate market so that the endogenous price vector
q in this exchange market may differ from the prices in the market where the producers sell
their goods after production. After the exchange, each producer will use his new bundle of
goods in his transformation process. After transformation, the remaining goods will be sold
at exogenous prices p. The goal of each producer is to maximize his proﬁt.
Let hN;A;!;pibeanLTPsituation. If q denotesthepricevectorintheexchangemarket,
then producer i 2 N exchanges his resource bundle !(i) for a bundle x(i) at price vector
q. A producer cannot spend more money on the bundle x(i) than the value of his resources
!(i): qTx(i)  qT!(i). After the exchange producer i will use the bundle x(i) as resources
for his transformation process. When producer i 2 N operates his transformation process at
an activity level yi then he needs the resources giyi. Since his resources now equal x(i),w e
get the restriction giyi  x(i). Finally, producer i will sell the remaining goods x(i)+a iy i
on the market at given prices p. In short, the proﬁt maximization problem of producer i in
model 1 is given by
max pT(x(i)+a iy i)
s:t:g i y i  x ( i )
y i  0
q T x ( i )  q T ! ( i )
x ( i )  0
(3)
An equilibrium in this model consists of a bundle of goods x(i), an activity level y
i for all
i 2 N and a price vector q such that producer i 2 N maximizes his proﬁt in x(i) and y
i




i 2 N! ( i ) .
Notethatthepricespare exogenouswhilethepricesq aredeterminedbytheequilibrium
conditions. Ifq isanequilibriumpricevectorandisapositiverealnumberthenqTx(i) 
qT!(i) if and only if (q)Tx(i)  (q)T!(i) and thus is q another equilibrium price
vector. This implies that in our search for equilibrium price vectors, we can restrict our
attention to prices in M = fq 2 I RM
+ j
P
j2M qj =1 g . Also note that if there is an
equilibrium price vector q then we can always ﬁnd a >0such that q  p.T h i s n e w
equilibrium price vector q ensures that producers trade their resources instead of selling
them on the market at exogenous prices p. We will now show that this model allows for an
8equilibrium.
Theorem 4 Let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation. If p 2 I RM
+ and!(i) 2 I RM
++ forall i 2 N
then there exists an equilibriumin model 1.
Proof. The proﬁt maximization problem of producer i 2 N is given by (3). The producer
can solvethisproblem in twosteps. When he knowsthat he willown x(i)after the exchange
then his maximization problem reduces to
max pT(x(i)+a iy i)
s :t:g i y i  x ( i )
y i  0
Since the objective function is continuous and the set fyijgiyi  x(i);y i0 gis compact
and non-empty, this reduced problem can be solved for all x(i).D e ﬁ n e
R i( x ( i )) = maxfpT(x(i)+a iy i)jg iy ix (i); yi  0g (4)
Then we can rewrite (3) as
max Ri(x(i))
s:t:q T x ( i )  q T ! ( i )
x ( i )  0
In the appendix we show that Ri is a continuous, monotone and quasi-concave function. If
we thinkofRi as theutilityfunctionof producer i thenthismaximizationproblemequalsthe
utilitymaximizationproblem of agent i inan exchange economy. DEBREU (1959) proves the
existence of an equilibrium in such an exchange economy and this also proves the existence
of an equilibriumin model 1.
2
In the second model, called model 2, a producer can start by transforming his resource
bundle, after which the producerscan mutuallyexchange theirproductsin a separate market.
After theexchange, each producerwillusehisnewbundleofgoodsin histransformationpro-
cess and sell theremaining goodsat exogenousprices p. Notice thatin thismodel production
takes place at two points in time. Again the goal of each producer is to maximize his proﬁt.
For a formal description of model 2, let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation. Then producer
i 2 N starts by transforming his resource bundle !(i) into !(i)+a ib y i with b yi such that
gib yi  !(i) and b yi  0. Next, this producer exchanges his products !(i)+a ib y ifor the
bundle x(i) at endogenous prices q. A producer cannot spend more money on the bundle
x(i) than the value of his products: qTx(i)  qT(!(i)+a ib y i). After the exchange has taken
place producer i willuse the bundle x(i)as resources for histransformation process. He will
sell the remaining goods x(i)+a iy ion the market at endogenous prices p where yi is such
thatgiyi  x(i)and yi  0. In short,theproﬁtmaximizationproblemof produceriinmodel
92i s
max pT(x(i)+a iy i)
s :t:g i y i  x ( i )
y i  0
q T x ( i )  q T ( ! ( i )+a ib y i)
x (i)0
g ib y i!(i)
b y i0
(5)
An equilibrium in this model consists of a price vector q and for all i 2 N of a bundle
of goods x(i), a production level y
i and a production level b y
i such that producer i 2 N
maximizes his proﬁt in x(i), y
i and b y





i 2 N( ! ( i )+a ib y 
i).
As in model 1 it holds that if q is an equilibrium price vector and  is a positive real
number then q is another equilibrium price vector. So in our search for equilibrium price
vectors, we can restrict our attention to prices in M = fq 2 I RM
+ j
P
j2M qj =1 g .
Next, we deﬁne irreversibility of the transformation process. The transformation set Ti
for the producer i is the set of all transformations possiblefor him:
Ti = fx 2 I RMjx  aiyi;g i y i! ( i ) ;y i0 g (6)
The set T =
P
i2N Ti is called the total transformation set. We say that the transformation
process is irreversible if T \ (−T)=f 0 g ,w h e r e− T=f x j−x2T g . This means that for
each transformation x 2 T, x 6=0 , the transformation −x is not possible;the transformation
process cannot be reversed.
Theorem 5 Let hN;A;!;pibe an LTP situation. If p 2 I RM
+ ;! ( i )2I R M
++ for all i 2 N
and the transformationprocess is irreversible then there exists an equilibriumin model 2.
Proof. The proﬁt maximization problem of producer i 2 N is given by (5). In lemma 3 in
the appendix we show that this problem is equivalentto
max pT(x(i)+a iy i)w h e r e v q ( i ) = max qT(!(i)+a ib y i)
s:t:g i y i  x ( i )s : t :g i b y i  ! ( i )
y i  0 b y i  0
q T x ( i )  v q ( i )
x ( i )  0
We can write this as
max Ri(x(i)) where vq(i)=q T! ( i ) + max qTaib yi
s:t:q T x ( i )  v q ( i )s : t :g i b y i  ! ( i )
x ( i )  0 b y i  0
(7)
10where, as in the proofof theorem 4, Ri(x(i)) = maxfpT(x(i)+aiyi)jgiyi x(i); yi  0_ g
is a continuous, monotone and quasi-concave function. Let uq(i) be the net proﬁt producer
i obtains over the value qT!(i) of his initial endowment: uq(i)=v q ( i ) −q T ! ( i ) ,o r ,
equivalently,
uq(i) = max qTaib yi =m a x q Tx
s : t :g i b y i  ! ( i )s : t :x 2 T i
b y i  0
where Ti is the transformation set of producer i as deﬁned in (6). If we substitutethis in (7)
we get
max Ri(x(i)) where uq(i) = max qTx
s:t:q T x ( i )  q T ! ( i )+u q(i)s : t :x 2 T i
x ( i )  0
(8)
If we think of Ri as the utility function of ’consumer’ i then the left hand side of (8) is the
utility maximization problem of consumer i in a private ownership economy as described in
DEBREU (1959). This consumer cannot spend more money on the bundle x(i) than the sum
of the value of his endowment and the net proﬁt of producer i. The right hand side of (8) is
the net proﬁt maximization problem of a producer in a private ownership economy. In this
model, consumer i and producer i are the same person and the net proﬁt of producer i goes
to consumer i. Debreu proves the existence of an equilibrium in such an economy and this
also proves the existence of an equilibrium in model 2.
2
We illustrateboth models with the followingexample.








Each producer owns one unit of each good: !(1) = !(2) = (1;1)T. One unit of each good
can be sold for 1 dollar: p =( 1 ;1)T. The value of each coalition in the LTP game is
v(f1g)=3 ;y 
1 =1
v ( f 2 g )=4 ;y 
2 =1
v ( f 1 ;2 g )=8 ;y 
1 =0 ;y 
2=2
The core of this game is the set C(v)=f ( x;8− x)j 3  x  4g.
In model 1, the proﬁt maximization problem of producer 1 is
max x(1)1 + x(1)2 + y1
s:t: 0  y1  x(1)1
qTx(1)  qT!(1)
x(1)  0
11Producer 1 will choose y1 as high as possible, so y
1 = x(1)1. The maximization problem
reduces to
max 2x(1)1 + x(1)2
s:t:q T x (1)  qT!(1)
x(1)  0
We restrict ourselves to prices q in 2 = fq 2 I R2jq1+q2 =1 g .For all q 2 2 it holdsthat
qT!(1) = q1 + q2 =1 . If we substitutethis in the maximization problem we get
max 2x(1)1 + x(1)2
s:t:q T x (1)  1
x(1)  0
Similarly we can reduce the proﬁt maximization problem of producer 2 to
max 3x(2)1 + x(2)2
s:t:q T x (2)  1
x(2)  0
where y
2 = x(2)1. In anequilibrium,demandshouldequalsupply: x(1)+x(2) = !(1)+
!(2) = (2;2)T. Theuniqueequilibriumpricein2isq =( 2
3;1
3) T. Toensurethatproducers
exchange their endowments,we can take, e.g., price vector q =3 q =( 2 ;1)T  p =( 1 ;1)T
in the exchange market. The equilibrium bundles are x(1) = (1
2;2)T, x(2) = (11
2;0)T




2. Note that producer 2 would like to
have as much units of good 1 as possiblesince he is the more efﬁcient producer and can earn
a lot of money by transforming them intounits of good 2 and sellingthese on the market. To
receive all the units of good 1 owned by producer 1, producer 2 has to offer in exchange the
goods that producer 1 could have produced from his units of good 1. Thus, producer 2 will
exchange two units of good 2 for one unit of good 1. But he owns just one unit of good 2
so he will exchange that unit for half a unit of good 1. Producer 2 now owns one and a half
unitsof good1which hetransforms intofourand a half unitsof good2. He sellsthese onthe
market and his proﬁt equals 41
2. Producer 1 transforms half a unit of good 1 into one unit of
good 2 and sells this together with his other two units of good 2 on the market. The proﬁt of
producer 1 equals 3=v ( f 1 g ) ,so he is indifferent between participatingin the exchange and
acting on his own. Producer 2 gains from the exchange, 41
2 >v ( f 2 g ) , thus both producers
participating in the exchange is better than both producers acting on their own. However,
(3;41
2) = 2 C(v)since3+41
2 <v ( N)=8 . Workingtogetherresultsina higherproﬁt. In this
example, both producers need good 1 in their transformation process. When producers need
different goods in their transformation process then it may hold that the equilibrium payoffs
in model 1 generate a core-element of the correspondingLTP game.
12In model 2, the proﬁt maximization problem of producer 1 is
max 2x(1)1 + x(1)2




> > > <
> > > :
3q2;q 1 < 2
3 ( b y 
1 =1 )
1 ;q 1 = 2
3 ( b y 
1 2 [0;1])
1;q 1 > 2
3 ( b y 
1 =0 )
where q 2 2 and we substitutedy
1 = x(1)1. For producer 2 it equals
max 3x(2)1 + x(2)2




> > > <
> > > :
4q2;q 1 < 3
4 ( b y 
2 =1 )
1 ;q 1 = 3
4 ( b y 
2 2 [0;1])
1;q 1 > 3
4 ( b y 
2 =0 )
where y
2 = x(2)1. In an equilibrium it should hold that x(1) + x(2) = !(1) + a1b y
1 +
!(2) + a2b y
2. The unique equilibrium price in 2 is q =( 3
4;1
4) T. To ensure that producers
exchange their endowments, we can take, e.g. q =4 q =( 3 ; 1)T  p =( 1 ; 1)T. The
equilibrium bundles are x(1) = (0;4)T, x(2) = (2 − b y
2;3b y
2 − 2)T and the equilibrium
activity levels are y




3  b y
2  1. As in model 1, producer 2
would like to have as much units of good 1 as possible, therefore he starts by transforming
good 1 into good 2. Producer 1 knows this and he starts by doing nothing. Producer 1 owns
one unit of the scarce good and he can ask three units of good 2 in exchange. This is exactly
what player 2 can produce from one unit of good 2. So, producer 1 exchanges one unit of
good 1 for three units of good 2. Since producer 1 now has no units of good 1 he cannot
produce so he sells his four units of good 2 on the market. His proﬁt equals 4. Producer
2o w n s(2 − b y
2;3b y
2 − 2)T after the exchange. He transforms 2 − b y
2 units of good 1 into
3(2 − b y
2)=6−3 b y 
2units of good 2. This leaves him with 3b y
2 − 2+6−3b y 
2 =4units
of good 2 to sell on the market. His proﬁt equals 4. Note that (4;4) 2 C(v).H o w e v e r ,
there are LTP situationswhere the payoffs in model 2 do not generate a core-element of the
corresponding LTP game.
5 A characterizationof totally balanced games
One restrictionof LTPsituationsis that each producerhas onlyonetransformationtechnique.
This is not very realistic. We can think,for example, of a ﬁrm producingtwogoods by using
two different transformationtechniques. In thissection we will extend LTP situationsso that
each producermay have more than onetechnique. We will call thesesituationsextended LTP
situations.
We assume now that a producer controls some resources and at least one transformation
technique. He chooses an activity level for each of his techniques. These choices depend
on his resources. Given an activity level, a transformation technique describes how much
input is needed. The producer can carry out his production processes at the desired activity
13levels only if his resources contain the required inputs. After production, the producer sells
the produced goods and unused resources in the insatiablemarket at exogenous prices.
We will now introduce some additional notation. A transformation technique is a vector
in I RM. Producer i 2 N can use a transformation technique ak if and only if k 2 Di
where Di denotes the set of all techniques controlled by producer i. The resources needed
for this technique are described by the vector gk 2 I RM
+ with gk
j =m a x f 0 ; − a k
j g .T h e
transformation matrix A, with its kth column corresponding to ak; is an element of I RMD
where D := (Di)i2N andtherelatedmatrix G,withitskth columncorrespondingtogk;isan
element of I RMD
+ . The vector of activity levels y 2 I RD
+ describes for each transformation
technique at which level it is operated. If we denote by D(S): =[ i 2 S D ithe set of all
transformation techniques available to coalition S then the proﬁt maximization problem of
this coalition is
max pT(!(S)+Ay)
s:t:G y  ! ( S )
y  0
y i =0i fi= 2D ( S )
(9)
An extended LTP situation is described by a 5-tuple hN;A;D;!;pi. Given such a situation
we deﬁne the corresponding extended LTP game (N;v)by the player set N and a function v
thatassignstoeach coalitionS  N themaximal proﬁtitcan obtainas in(9)where v(;)=0 .
These extended LTP games have some nice properties. First, they are balanced. The
proof is similar to that of theorem 1. Since each subgame (S;vjS) is another extended LTP
game, these games are totally balanced. Moreover, we can write each totally balanced game
(N;u)with nonnegative values, i.e. u(S)  0 for all S  N, as an extended LTP game.
Theorem 6 Each totally balanced game with nonnegative values is an extended LTP game.
Proof. Let (N;u) be a totally balanced game with nonnegative values. We construct an
extended LTP situationsuch that for the corresponding LTP game it holds that v(S)=u ( S)
for all S  N.
Theset ofproducersequals N. AssumethatN = f1;:::;ng.D e ﬁ n eD i=f SN ji2
S; j < i ) j= 2S gthen each transformation technique of producer i is related to a coalition
of which the producer is the ’ﬁrst’ member. So, each coalition is related to one producer.
Producer i controls2n−i techniquesandall the producerstogethercontrol2n −1 techniques.
Deﬁnen+2n−1goodsinM asfollows. Eachoftheﬁrst ngoodsisrelatedtoaproducer
in N and each of the 2n − 1 goods is related to a nonempty coalitionin N.
The transformation technique related to coalition S is denoted by aS. Technique aS 2
I Rn+2n−1 contains −eS on the ﬁrst n rows and the remaining 2n − 1 rows are related to the
nonempty coalitions such that aS
U =1if U = S and 0 otherwise. So, the transformation
technique aS uses one unit of each ”good” j for all j 2 S to produce one unit of ”good” S.
14The transformation matrix A is an (n +2 n−1)  (2n − 1)-matrix. The related matrix G
contains columns gS with eS on its ﬁrst n rows and zeros in the remaining rows.




i 2 S! ( i ) . The price vector p 2 I Rn+2n−1 is deﬁned as follows. The ﬁrst n goods,
the inputs,have pricezero, pj =0if1  j  n, and goodS hasvalue u(S),pS = u(S).F o r
ease ofnotation,deﬁnetheshortenedpricevectorp(u) 2 I R2n−1 byp(u)S := pS. Thevector
of activitylevels y 2 I R2n−1
+ describes the activitylevel of each transformation techniqueaS,
y =( y S) S 2 2 Nnf;g.
Take an S 2 2Nnf;g.T h e v a l u e v ( S ) of this coalition is deﬁned by (9). From our


















T: T\ S 6 = ;e Ty T e S
y T =0i fT\S=;
So we get that




yT  0 for all T
yT =0i fT\S=;







yT  0 for all T
yT =0i fT\S=;
Since (N;u)is a totallybalanced game withnonnegativevalues, itfollowsthat v(S)=u ( S)
and yT =1if T = S and yT =0otherwise.
2
This theorem implies in particular that each linear production game, as introduced by
OWEN (1975) and studied in CURIEL,D ERKS and TIJS (1989), can be written as an extended
LTP game. Since each totally balanced game with nonnegative values can also be written as
a linear productiongame, the other way around also holds.
A Appendix
In this section we present the proofs that were omitted in section 4.
Lemma 1 The functionRi as deﬁned in (4) is continuousfor all i 2 N.
Proof. This proof consists of six steps. Let i 2 N.
15(i) Deﬁne the multifunctionFi from I RM
+ toI R+ byFi(x)=f y ijg iy ix ;y i0 gthen
Fi(x)=[ 0 ;y i( x )] where yi(x) = maxfyij giyi  x; yi  0g.S i n c eg iand x both contain
a ﬁnite number of elements that are ﬁnite and nonnegative and since we assumed that gi
contains at least one positiveelement, the number yi(x) is ﬁnite. So, Fi is a compact-valued
multifunction.
(ii) We show that yi(x) is a continuousfunction. Deﬁne the carrier set ofgi by C(gi)=
f j2Mjg i
j>0 g . This set is nonempty. Next, consider the followingobservations:
 j= 2C ( g i ) ) g i
j y i ( x )=0x j
 j2C ( g i) ,g i
jy i( x )=x j ) y i( x )=x j=gi
j
 j 2 C(gi), gi
jyi(x) <x j ) y i( x )<x j=gi
j
These observations imply that yi(x) = minfxj=gi
jj j 2 C(gi)g.S i n c eg iis a ﬁxed vector,
C(gi) is a ﬁxed set containing a ﬁnite number of elements, so yi(x) is the minimum of a
ﬁnite number of continuousfunctions. We conclude that yi(x) is a continuousfunction.
(iii) We show that Fi is an upper semicontinuous(usc) multifunction. Let xi 2 I RM
+ and
let O be an open setin I R+ such that Fi(xi)  O.T h e ny i ( x i )2O .S i n c ey iis a continuous
function, y−1
i (O) is an open set in I RM
+ . By deﬁnition of the inverse, for all b xi 2 y−1
i (O) it
holds that yi(b xi) 2 O and thus Fi(b xi)  O.S o ,F iis usc.
(iv) We show that Fi is a lower semicontinuous (lsc) multifunction. Let xi 2 I RM
+ and
let O be an open set in I R+ such that Fi(xi) \ O 6= ;.I fy i ( x i )=0then Fi(xi)=f 0 gand
0 2 O. Take an open set Ox in I RM
+ such that xi 2 Ox. Then for all b xi 2 Ox it holds that
Fi(b xi) \ O f 0 g\O=f0g6 =;
If yi(xi) > 0 then there is a t 2 Fi(xi) \ O such that 0 <t<y i( x i) .D e ﬁ n ee x i=g i tthen
yi(e xi)=t .S i n c e y i ( x i )>tthere is an r>0such that for all b xi 2 B(xi;r), the sphere
in I RM
+ around xi with radius r, it holds that yi(b xi)  yi(e xi)=t . This implies that for all
b xi 2 B(xi;r)
Fi(b x i)\O=[ 0 ;y i( b x i)] \ O  [t;yi(b xi)]\ O f t g6 =;
So, Fi is lsc.
(v) Deﬁne fi(xi;y i)=p T ( x i+a i y i ) . This function is the sum of two continuous
functions, so fi is continuous.
(vi) Since Fi :I R M
+ !I R +is a compact-valued usc and lsc multifunction and fi :
I RM
+  I R+ ! I R+ is a continuous function, the Maximum theorem of BERGE (1963) says
that Ri(xi) = maxffi(xi;y i)jy i2Fi(x i)gis a continuousfunctionfor all i 2 N.
2
Lemma 2 The functionRi as deﬁned in (4) is monotoneand quasi-concave for all i 2 N.
16Proof. Let i 2 N. First, we show that Ri is monotone. Let z, x 2 I RM
+ such that z  x,
z 6= x.I fg i y ixthen also giyi  z so fyij giyi  x; yi  0gf y ijg i y iz ;y i0 g .
W ea s s u m e di nt h e o r e m4t h a tp2I R M
+ so pTx  pTz. Now it holds that
Ri(x) = maxfpT(x+ aiyi)j giyi  x; yi  0g
 maxfpT(z + aiyi)j giyi  z; yi  0g = Ri(z)
so Ri is a monotone function for all i 2 N.
Next, we show that Ri is quasi-concave, i.e. we show that for all b;c 2 I RM
+ , b 6= c and
for all  2 (0;1) it holds that Ri(b +( 1− ) c )minfRi(b);R i(c)g.L e t b;c 2 I RM
+ ,
b 6= c and let  2 (0;1).
If pTai  0 then
Ri(b +( 1− ) c )= p T( b +( 1− ) c )=pTb +( 1− ) p Tc
 minfpTb;pTcg =m i n f R i( b ) ;R i(c)g
If pTai > 0 then Ri(b +( 1− ) c )=p T( b +( 1− ) c+a iy i( b +( 1− ) c )).B y
deﬁnition of yi it holds that
yi(b +( 1− ) c ) = minf(b +( 1− ) c ) j=gi
jj j 2 C(gi)g
 minfbj=gi
jj j 2 C(gi)g +m i n f (1− )cj=gi
jj j 2 C(gi)g
= minfbj=gi
jj j 2 C(gi)g+( 1− )min fc j=gi
jj j 2 C(gi)g
= yi(b)+(1− )y i(c)
This implies that
Ri(b +( 1− ) c )= p T( b +( 1− ) c+a iy i( b +( 1− ) c ))
= pTb +( 1− ) p Tc+p Ta iy i( b +( 1− ) c )
 pTb +( 1− ) p Tc+p Ta i[  y i( b )+(1− )y i(c)]
= pT(b + aiyi(b))+ (1− )pT(c+ aiyi(c))
= Ri(b)+(1− )R i(c)
 minfRi(b);R i(c)g





of model 2. This result is used in the proof of theorem 5.




i)is an optimal solutionof
max pT(x(i)+a iy i)
s :t:g i y i  x ( i )
y i  0
q T x ( i )  q T ( ! ( i )+a ib y i)






max pT(x(i)+a iy i)w h e r e v q ( i ) = max qT(!(i)+a ib y i)
s:t:g i y i  x ( i )s : t :g i b y i  ! ( i )
y i  0 b y i  0
q T x ( i )  v q ( i )
x ( i )  0
Proof. First, let (x(i);y 
i,b y
i)be an optimalsolutionof a). It remains to show that b y
i is an
optimal solutionof vq(i),i . e .
q T( !( i )+a ib y
i) = max qT(!(i)+a ib y i)
s :t:g i b y i  ! ( i )
b y i  0
We show this by contradiction. Suppose that it is not true. Then there exists a e yi such that
qT(!(i)+a ie y i) = max qT(!(i)+a ib y i)>q T( ! ( i )+a ib y 
i)
s :t:g i b y i  ! ( i )
b y i  0
So vq(i)=q T( ! ( i )+a ie y i). Producer i can spend more money and in particular he can buy
a bundle of goods e x(i) such that he has more of all goods: e x(i)j >x  ( i ) jfor all j 2 M.
But since he now has more goods, he can produce more goods, reaching a higher activity
level and receiving a higher proﬁt: pT(e x(i)+a iy i)>p T( x ( i )+a iy i). Thiscontradictsthe
assumption that (x(i);y 
i,b y
i)maximizes the proﬁt of producer i.
Next, let (x(i);y 
i,b y
i)be an optimal solutionof b). Then (x(i);y 
i,b y
i)satisﬁes all the
constraints in a). Since the maximization problem of a) contains more constraints than the
problem of b), (x(i);y 
i,b y
i)is also an optimal solutionof a).
2
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